Introduction
Sasfin ( 4 Recognition of public policy as the South African general clause is on its own not sufficient to launch attacks on unfair terms and/or contracts. Public policy requires concretisation, which in itself will be a slow process.
In 2002 Cameron JA directed in Brisley v Drotsky 5 that:
All law is therefore subject to constitutional control, and all law inconsistent with the Constitution is invalid. That includes the common law of contract which is subject to the supreme law of the Constitution. The Bill of Rights applies to all law and binds the Judiciary … In addition the Constitution requires the courts, when developing the common law of contract, to promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights. (SCA) para 27: " [A] lthough abstract values such as good faith, reasonableness and fairness are fundamental to our law of contract, they do not constitute independent substantive rules that courts can employ to intervene in contractual relations. These abstract values perform creative, informative and controlling functions through established rules of the law of contract. They cannot be acted upon by the courts directly. Acceptance of the notion that judges can refuse to enforce a contractual provision merely because it offends their personal sense of fairness and equity will give rise to legal and commercial uncertainty. The concerns voiced by Brand JA and Harms DP become even more complex when considering the impact of the Constitution, which is expressly value-based and demands that the judiciary take cognisance of substantive values.
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Consequently, the use of public policy as a general clause within the ambit of the rule of law necessitates providing content to this open norm. Such concretisation is currently in the process of being developed. Justice Brand paved the way for the Barkhuizen decision in Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom when he held that "Terselfdertyd moet aanvaar word dat ongelyke bedingingsmag wel 'n faktor is wat, tesame met ander faktore, by oorweging van die openbare belang 'n rol kan speel."
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The Court recognised inequality of bargaining power as one element of public policy but required an additional factor or factors before it can be said that the term or contract is in conflict with public policy.
In order to address the reservations concerning the lack of certainty in regard to open norms it is necessary to ascertain which other factor(s) could qualify as a requirement together with inequality of bargaining power in order to give meaning to Apart from providing insight into concretising public policy the case also presents an excellent application of the Barkhuizen formula regarding constitutional challenges of contractual terms.
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See ss 1, 7, 39(1) and (2). 
Facts
The issue in this case concerns the validity and enforceability of three notarial lease agreements concluded between the applicant and the respondent. The applicant church owns three immovable properties on which were situated three public schools under the control and administration of the state (the Western Cape Provincial
Minister of Transport and Public Works). 15 As a result of Apartheid policies many communities suffered a severe lack of educational facilities. The applicant being a religious order felt compelled to assume responsibility for providing educational facilities to the communities it served. This responsibility included developing new and improving existing school buildings on its properties. In order to finance these projects the applicant had to raise funds. circumstances of the particular case. 37 In consequence the fairness test is two-fold.
The first part relates to the question concerning the objective terms of the contract, 38 ie if the particular clause in the contract passes the considerations of reasonableness and fairness, since public policy would preclude the enforcement of a contractual term if this would be unjust or unfair. 39 If it is found that the objective terms pass the muster of public policy the second part of the test is activated viz whether these terms are "contrary to public policy in the light of the relative situation of the contracting parties", 40 or "whether the clause should be enforced in the light of the circumstances which prevented compliance". 41 Thus the relative situation of the contracting parties is a relevant consideration in determining if a contractual term is contrary to public policy. 42 Consequently, the second part of the test is clearly subjective in nature since it involves the contextualisation of the parties' position.
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The Constitutional Court determined that the first question of the test (the objective test) involves balancing the constitutional values of freedom and dignity which inform the maxim pacta sunt servanda with a specific constitutional right or value. In the case under discussion Zondi J addressed the first (objective) question, whether the offending term was fair, by balancing the principle of pacta servanda sunt against the constitutional right to seek judicial redress. 46 The honourable judge pointed out that access to justice is twofold. On the one hand it provides a forum to seek enforcement of a contract or term but on the other hand it also provides the stage to ask for non-enforcement because the contract or term is contrary to public policy because it is unfair. 47 The honourable justice emphasised that the courts must ensure a minimum degree of fairness. 48 In regard to this aspect of citizens' rights to access to justice, Zondi J moved to the second part of the Barkhuizen test, which was subjective in nature. Zondi J raised the issue of the parties' relative bargaining positions at the time of the conclusion of the agreement. 49 Thus, the circumstances of the case and the relevant situation of the parties were examined, which examination involved contextualizing the contract.
The subjective part of the Barkhuizen test is complex when read in the context of Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom, 50 where Brand JA held that it is obvious that inequality of bargaining power in itself does not justify the conclusion that a term which favours the "stronger" party will necessarily be contrary to public policy. He also added that at the same time it must be accepted that inequality of bargaining power is a factor which together with other factors can play a role in the consideration of public policy. Thus, the South African judiciary has indicated that the foundational source for unfairness is an unequal bargaining position of the contracting parties together with other factors. 51 From the aforegoing, the conclusion appears justified that with the introduction of the subjective test the Constitutional Court has recognised substantive equality in the law of contract, since the contextualisation of the parties' position requires consideration ie that the circumstances of the case and the parties relevant situation be taken into account.
The development of the principle of public policy was continued in Barkhuizen by Ngcobo J, 52 which raises the question whether "tesame met" 53 / "together with" 54 should be interpreted as "among" / "alongside" or "in conjunction with" / "in cooperation with" / "plus". It is submitted that according to Brand J inequality of bargaining power is not sufficient on its own to sustain a finding that a particular term of a contract is contrary to public policy and thus unenforceable. Consequently, to define "public policy" another element is required to supplement the inequality of bargaining power.
Until Uniting Reformed Church no opportunity has presented itself to specify which other factor(s) may be taken into account when assessing the validity or enforceability of a clause on the basis of its being contrary to public policy. It should be noted that the recognition of an unequal bargaining position as a co-determinant of public policy should be acknowledged as being extremely valuable in the development of rules pertaining to standard contracts. This closely follows the international practice of considering this to be a factor in the determination of the reasonableness or unreasonableness of a term. position. In this regard the court found for the applicant Church that they had been in an unequal bargaining position in relation to the state. 57 The respondent did not dispute the fact that the parties had been in an unequal bargaining position, since "the terms of the notarial lease agreements were necessitated by the realities that faced both the applicant and the (State) Department of Education of the Administration: House of Representatives, namely financial resources".
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It is submitted that it seems trite that unconscionable terms more often than not arise from an inequality of bargaining power. 59 In the English case of Lloyds Bank v Bundy 60 the court held that "[W]hen the one is so strong in bargaining power and the other so weak … it is not right that the strong should be allowed to push the weak to the wall".
61 This opinion was followed in Macaulay 62 where it was held that it was necessary to protect "those whose bargaining power is weak against being forced by those whose bargaining power is stronger to enter into bargains that are unconscionable".
It is suggested that such cases of inequality may also be described as exploitative. In many cases 63 exploitation appears to arise organically from an inequality of bargaining power. It is the latter phenomenon which leads to the recognition of exploitation as the elusive "other factor" as a co-determinant, together with inequality, of public policy.
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In United Uniting Reformed, De Doorns v President of the Republic of South Africa 2013 5 SA 205 (WCC) para 35 Zondi J quotes from the applicant's founding affidavits that: "… the Department, which represented so-called coloured own affairs in terms of the apartheid tricameral system, dictated the terms of the agreement, which the applicant had little option but to accept" (para 16 of the affidavit). And that: "… the impugned provision in the lease agreement was inserted at the instance of the state and the applicant was left with no choice in the matter. It simply had to comply in order to fulfil the demands of the state for assuming responsibility of the schools" (para 28 of the affidavit). However, in a case where a soccer player is sold by his club to another club, he is in an unequal bargaining position vis a vis the club, but it is doubtful that he is ever exploited.
Exploitation: section 25 of the Constitution, the proscription of the arbitrary deprivation of property
After acknowledging the inequality of the parties Zondi J moves on to the applicants' contention that undertaking to transfer the properties free of charge after the expiration of the leases was inimical to the values enshrined in the Constitution, and The relevant parts of s 25 are the following: No one may be deprived of property except in terms of law of general application, and no law may permit arbitrary deprivation of property. Property may be expropriated only in terms of law of general application (a) for a public purpose or in the public interest; and (b) subject to compensation, the amount of which and the time and manner of payment of which have either been agreed to by those affected or decided or approved by a court.
(c) The amount of the compensation and the time and manner of payment must be just and equitable, reflecting an equitable balance between the public interest and the interests of those affected, having regard to all relevant circumstances, including (d) the current use of the property; (e) the history of the acquisition and use of the property; (f) the market value of the property; (g) the extent of direct state investment and subsidy in the acquisition and beneficial capital improvement of the property; and (h) the purpose of the expropriation.
66
Section 25 (1) Essentially section 25, the property clause, provides protection against exploitation.
In this case it is clear that the enforcement of the agreement would have resulted in the exploitation of the applicant. Nevertheless, what is important here is the fact that the element of exploitation might be thought to play a role complementary to the inequality of bargaining power, as the obscure "other" factor to be taken into account when determining public policy. It is submitted that from this case it is possible to deduce that the element of exploitation may be recognised as the other factor to be taken account of, together with an inequality between the parties, when deciding whether an unfair contract or term is unenforceable because it is contrary to public policy. Furthermore, coupling inequality to exploitation should harness the discretionary role of public policy and as such address the honourable Brand JA and Harm DP's concerns regarding the width of application of this open norm.
The conclusion that exploitation together with inequality can be used to define public policy may also be drawn from comparative and extra judicial research. Some of the European codifications, national consumer legislation and the philosopher Wertheimer emphasise the link between inequality and exploitation.
Exploitation: Wertheimer's hypothesis of the element of exploitation, the European Civil Codes and national and international consumer legislation
The seminal work by Alan Wertheimer 78 on the subject of "exploitation" provides certainty that exploitation constitutes a fitting additional factor as required by our judiciary. Wertheimer has identified that an inequality of bargaining power spawns exploitation and that the latter has its roots in inequality of bargaining power. 79 From his thesis it is submitted that inequality of bargaining power and exploitation constitute the two sides of the public policy coin and consequently constitute the requirements for supporting a claim that an unfair term or agreement is in contravention of public policy. conditions that have to be present in order for weakness to be exploitable. He requires first that the parties must be in an asymmetrical relationship; secondly that the subordinate party must need the resource that the superordinate supplies;
thirdly that the subordinate party must depend upon some particular superordinate for the supply of the resources needed; and finally that the superordinate enjoys a discretionary control over the resources that the subordinate needs. 81 If these requirements are applied to the facts of the Uniting Reformed Church case, all of them are met. There is no doubt that the Church was in an unequal bargaining position vis-a-vis the State, that the Church needed the State's intervention to assist in raising funds, that the Church required the State's educational resources and that the State had discretionary control in aiding the Church to obtain the assistance needed. Consequently, it is possible to draw the conclusion that the undertaking to transfer the properties to the State free of charge upon expiration of the lease was clearly exploitative on a literal level.
Identification of exploitation as a suitable co-determinant with the inequality of bargaining power in order to establish what is meant by "public policy" is also supported by international codifications and directives. In Germany article 138(2) of the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch provides:
Nichtig ist insbesondere ein Rechtsgeschäft, durch das jemand unter Ausbeutung der Zwangslage, der Unerfahrenheit, des Mangels an Urteilsvermögen oder der erheblichen Willensschwäche eines anderen sich oder einem Dritten für eine Leistung Vermögensvorteile versprechen oder gewähren lässt, die in einem auffälligen Missverhältnis zu der Leistung stehen. Goodin "Reasons for Welfare" 37.
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Article 138(2) of the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch: "A transaction wherein someone exploits the necessity, lack of experience, lack of discernment or lack of willpower of another, obtains monetary advantage or a promise to be granted monetary advantage out of proportion to his own performance is void." Translation sourced from www.fd.ul.pt. inequitable". 89 It is not difficult to come to the conclusion that exploitation would qualify as an example of a term which is excessively adverse.
These articles in the German and Swiss Civil Codes, the CESL and the Consumer Protection Act, together with Wertheimer's thesis, have been instrumental in identifying the element of exploitation as complementing that of inequality as a codeterminant of public policy.
Conclusion
This case is interesting on two levels. First, the court gave cognisance to the Constitutional Court's decision not to apply constitutional rights directly but to follow "unfair" with reference to "inequitable and unfair", creating a circular argument, will not be dealt with in this paper. What is important for the proposition that exploitation be recognised as the co-determinant with inequality to define public policy is the fact that the CPA included the provision "a term is unfair if it is excessively one-sided".
Codifications, Directives and the work of Wertheimer, it is suggested that where exploitation results from an unequal bargaining relationship it provides the "further factor" that, together with inequality, is sufficient to establish that the contractual term or contract is in conflict with public policy. Exploitation together with inequality facilitates giving meaning to public policy.
Identifying two factors to contextualise public policy will also limit its interpretation variants and thus honour the rule of law while still giving cognisance to the transformative imperative of the Constitution. The hurdle which the two elements form could put in place clear checks and balances, preventing uncertainty when a claim of contrary to public policy because of unfairness is raised. inequality in bargaining power, is sufficient to establish that the term or contract is in conflict with public policy. This contributes to giving meaning to the term "public policy". To support this argument, reference is made to the German Civil Code, the Swiss Civil Code, consumer protection legislation and the philosophy of Wertheimer.
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